Numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors. This paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth: fiscal decentralization. The results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy
Introduction
Scholars attempting to isolate the underlying causes of public sector growth have modeled Wagner's law, budget-maximizing bureaucrats, behavior of special interest groups, the effect of rising tax revenues on government expenditures and many other factors. 1 Studies have also examined the empirical relation between macroeconomic growth and public sector size and growth. 2 A recent avenue of research is concerned with devising effective constraints on government size and growth. This paper studies the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980) hypothesis that fiscal decentralization is one behavioral constraint that determines public sector size. Empirical verification of the hypothesis would lend support for the Leviathan view of government that models public sector behavior as driven by self-interest subject to constraints. Moreover, evidence supporting the decentralization hypothesis would suggest that efforts initiated by the Reagan Administration to further decentralization will, over time, contribute to smaller total government in the United States.
Constructing limits on Leviathan
The public choice literature owes much to Downs (1957) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) for questioning the public interest theory of government and for carrying over the reality of self-interest in the private sector to the study of pub-*The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Angelo R. Mascaro, Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee. Views expressed here are of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Treasury. lic sectors. Economic behavior is assumed to be determined, in part, by behavioral constraints. Similar to the notion of a budget set constraining the behavior of private utility-maximizing consumers, political and economic constraints determine, in part, public servant behavior. An important implication is that when constraints do not undergo significant change over time, public sector behavior can be expected to be relatively invariant as well. Conversely, fundamental changes in constraints facing public servants are necessary ingredients for fundamental changes in behavior. Some condense this notion into the rubric: 'Institutions Matter.' Two examples are now discussed.
Milton Friedman (1986) recently concluded that much of his time was 'ill spent' in attempting to persuade the Federal Reserve System to adopt more monetarist proposals. He states that his assumption that government servants maximize the public interest was the underlying flaw. Rather, the behavior of Federal Reserve officials should be assumed to respond to self-interest. Friedman concludes: 'I'm not criticizing anybody except those who were responsible for setting up institutions that are not consistent with such a framework.' (p. 3). Optimal policy strategy in an environment of public officials pursuing self-interest would be determined'.., by analyzing the changes in institutional arrangements that would bring about the deslred results and trying to persuade the public to introduce those institutional changes rather than trying to influence policy makers directly' (p. 5).
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) provides another example. Taxpayer sensitivity to larger government is argued to be lower the more indirect the tax used to finance government spending. The argument is that the more direct the tax, the greater its 'pain'. The policy implication is that when governments have the ability to finance spending via debt finance and inflation, there will be relatively larger government sectors than in economies where governments are financed 'more directly.' In other words, the methods available to finance public sector spending determine, in part, the relevant definition of 'institutions'. Buchanan and Wagner argue that adding a balanced budget amendment to the constitution would alter the public sector's propensity for deficit finance and spending growth.
Fiscal decentralization hypothesiss
The decentralization hypothesis is that 'Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized' (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980: 15) . The means by which a move toward fiscal centralization may affect government size may be seen through its effect on the government's budget, or opportunity, set. Manage and Marlow (1986) argue that public spending is constrained by
